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There is currently a growing interest in the aeronautical community to assess the effects of the
increasing levels of automation on pilots' performance and overall safety.
The first effect of automation is the change in the nature of the pilot's role on the flight deck.
Pilots have become supervisors who monitor aircraft systems in usual situations and intervene
only when unanticipated events occur. Instead of "hand flying" the airplane, pilots contribute to
the control of aircraft by acting as mediators, instructions given to the automation.
By eliminating the need for manually controlling normal situations, such a role division has
reduced the opportunities for the pilot to acquire experience and skills necessary to safely cope
with abnormal events (Bainbridge, 1987).
Difficulties in assessing the state and behaviour of automation arise mainly from four
factors:
• the complexity of current systems (e.g., Billings, 1991) and consequent mode-related
problems (Sarter & Woods, 1993)
• the intrinsic autonomy of automation which is able to fire mode transitions without
explicit commands from the pilots (e.g., Sarter & Woods, 1992)
• the bad quality of feed-back from the control systems displays and interfaces to the
pilots (e.g., Norman, 1990 ; Sarter & Woods, 1992), and
• the fact that the automation currently has no explicit representation of the current
pilots' intentions and strategy (Onken, 1992 a; 1992 b).
The conjunction of those factors induces a large set of crew-automation interaction problems
that pose questions to the current research: difficulties in anticipating computer generated mode
changes, difficulties assessing the implications of changes to previously given instructions,
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difficulties in reacting to unanticipated events and to command changes, difficulties in finding,
integrating and interpreting relevant data for situation assessment and difficulties in building
extended and refined mental models of how automation is working and how instructions have
to be input (Sarter & Woods, 1992).
For pilots, the consequences of those difficulties are an increase in cognitive workload and
the development of "unofficial" strategies to override or "hijack" the automation, in an attempt
to satisfy "official" goals (Amalberti, 1992).
As a result, certification isfacing a range of new and complex problems that challenge the
aeronautical community to predict and account for all kinds of pilot-automation interaction
patterns arising from the introduction of new and sophisticated technologies in cockpits.
The rapid pace of automation is outstripping one's ability to comprehend all the
implications for crew performance. It is unrealistic to call for a halt to cockpit automation
until the manifestations are completely understood. We do, however, call for those
designing, analysing, and installing automatic systems in the cockpit to do so carefully;
to recognize the behavioural effects of automation; to avail themselves of present and
future guidelines, and to be watchful for symptoms that might appear in training and
operational settings. (Wiener & Curry, 1980) (Mentioned by Billings, 1991, p. 67)
In particular, this paper tries to characterize the added complexity and problems created by
the introduction of autonomous agents as (intended as automated resources) in new generations
of aircraft.
As an example of the potential for catastrophic consequences of these problems, we would
like to refer to the China Airlines B747-SP accident, 300 miles Northwest of San Francisco, of
February 19, 1985, using the accident report proposed by Billings:
The airplane, flying at 41,000 ft. enroute to Los Angeles from Taipei, suffered an inflight
upset after an uneventful flight. The airplane was on autopilot when the n. 4 engine lost
power. During attempts to relight the engine, the airplane rolled to the right, nosed over
and begun an uncontrollable descent. The Captain was unable to restore the airplane to
stable flight until it had descended to 9500 ft.
The autopilot was operating in the performance management system (PMS) mode for
pitch guidance and altitude hold. Roll commands were provided by the INS, which uses
only the ailerons and spoilers for lateral control; rudder and rudder trim are not used. In
light turbulence, airspeed increased. As the airplane slowed, the PMS moved the throttles
forward but without effect. The flight engineer moved the n. 4 throttle forward but
without effect. The INS caused the autopilot to hold the left wing down since it could
not correct with rudder. The airplane decelerated due to the lack of power. After
attempting to correct the situation with autopilot, the Captain disengaged the autopilot at
which time the airplane rolled to the right, yawed, then entered a steep descent in cloud,
during which it exceeded maximum operating speed. It was extensively damaged during
the descent and recovery (1991, p. 98).
As noted by the author, the NTSB concluded that:
... the probable cause was the captain's preoccupation with an inflight malfunction and
his failure to monitor properly the airplane's flight instruments which resulted in his
losing control of the airplane. Contributing to the accident was the captain's over reliance
on the autopilot after a loss on n. 4 engine. The Board noted that the autopilot effectively
masked the approaching onset of loss of control of the airplane. (ibid., p. 98.).
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Without stating too much about the concepts that will be developed in the following
sections, yet in contrast to the first elements of analysis retained by the NTSB, this paper
claims that this accident's main contributing factors areflaws in the design of the information
and control systems combined with the presence of agents that operate independently of any
pilot's control action but without adequate feedback.
More precisely, as revealed by this incident, the breakdown of the pilot-automation system
onboard this aircraft - which is typical of a design currently known as "technology centered
automation" - is mainly due to a lack of controllability of the automatic systems involved,
coupled with a lack of visibility and predictability of those systems' status, effects and
interactions over the considered flight phase, and an engine failure.
Assuming certification has among its major goals to guarantee the passengers' and pilots'
safety and the airplane integrity under normal and abnormal operational conditions, the authors
suggest it would be particularly fruitful to come up with a conceptual reference system
providing the certification authorities both with a theoretical framework and a list of principles
usable for assessing the quality of the equipment and designs under examination.
This is precisely the scope of this paper. However, if the authors recognize that the
conceptual system presented is still under development and would thus be best considered as a
source of reflection for the design, evaluation and certification processes of advanced aviation
technologies.
The Multiple Resources of Automation
We consider automation to be a tool or resource - a device, system or method by which
the human can accomplish some task that might be otherwise difficult or impossible, or
which the human can direct to carry out more or less independently a task that would
otherwise require increased human attention or effort. (Bilings, 1991, p. 7)
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Figure 1. A simplified diagram of automated control of automation
Four components define the classical automated control situation (Figure 1) (e.g., Sheridan,
1988):
• A set of users, operators or pilots with some goals or tasks to achieve
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• An object, a process, or a world, characterized by a set of stated variables, upon
which the users want to act
• A set of automated resources which possess the capability to change the state of the
world on the behalf of the user
• An interface which provides the user with the means to activate and control these
resources.
It is clear from everyday life experiences (Norman, 1986) that resources can display very
different behavioral characteristics, and that this influences the way we use them as well as the
type and amount of knowledge we need to do this efficiently.
The following three essential categories of resources can be identified according to their
different behavioral characteristics.
Functions constitute the simpler type of resources and affect the state of the world in a
straightforward way. Their effect only depends on the state of the world prior to their
activation. Moreover, this effect can be described by a simple state transition: the state of the
world before and after the activation of the function. Functions are thus usually extremely
predictable resources (e.g., manual seat-belt and non-smoking signs activation, manual throttle
control, etc.).
Functional patterns constitute the second type of resource. The behaviour of functional patterns
is also only dependant on the state of the world prior to their activation. Nevertheless,
contrarily to functions, their effects are not described as simple state transition but as sequences
of successive states. Predictability of these patterns is still high, but requires more information
than with simple functions (e.g., landing gear extraction and retraction, flaps retraction).
Agents finally are described by sequences of successive states. Nevertheless, with agents
sequences are not only influenced by initial conditions but also by conditions varying during
execution of the sequences themselves (e.g., agents range from low-level automatisms [attitude
stabilizers...] to high-level pilot aiding devices [the Flight Management Systems or the
Performance Management Systems]):
In more automated systems, the level of animacy of machine agents has
dramatically increased. Once activated, systems are capable of carrying out long
sequences of tasks autonomously. For example, advanced Flight Management
Systems can be programmed to automatically control the aircraft from takeoff
through landing. (Sarter & Woods, 1993, p. 6)
As suggested by the previous examples, automated functions, functional patterns and agents
are present in most technological contexts. Processes and agents are especially useful in task-
intensive situations and have come to progressively replace functions in modern airplanes.
Several reasons account for that evolution.
The ftrst is that, as any human operators, pilots are limited in their perceptual abilities (e.g.
they cannot free control the airplane's attitude without assistance or manually react to events in
milliseconds) and in their capacities to process information (cf. the classical concepts of
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boundedrationality(Simon,1957)*andshorterm(Miller,1956)or workingmemory(Baddeley& Hitch,1974;Baddeley,1986;Reason,1987)limitationsin cognitive
psychology).
Somexternalresourcescanbeintroducedtocopewiththeselimitations,butit shouldbe
clearthatpurelyfunctionalresourcescannotsufficeinhighlydynamicsituationssuchas
pilotinganairplane.Becauseofhumans'limitedbandwidthI/Ochannelsandbecauseoftheir
limitedandratherslowprocessingcapabilities,it isnotpossibletoensurecorrectoordination
andactivationofmultiplefunctionalresources.Agents, on the other hand, because they can be
considered as functions with autonomy, display that ability to coordinate, at least locally,
several specialized functions (Maes, 1989). Agents integrate the logic behind functional
integration and activation (acting on the process through functions - see the notion of
competence - or recursively through simpler agents).
Producers (airplane designers) and consumers (commercial airlines) have extended the
scope of the tasks expected from the global system crew/airplane/ATC. The necessity to
enhance safety and performance while flying in highly dense and crowded airspace are among
the main motivations for the introduction of agents in airplanes. As a result, the complexity of
the flying task has grown to such levels that it has become necessary to extend the perceptive,
motor and processing capabilities of the crew. The task itself has been broken down into
simpler primitive subtasks that have been allocated to specialized agents.
Thus, there has been a continuous trend in aeronautics to introduce more and more
automation into cockpits. However, some problems related to this approach have been
described by several human factors experts, like Salter and Woods:
New automation is developed because of some payback (precision, more data,
reduced staffing, etc.) for some beneficiary (the individual practitioner, the
organization, the industry, society). But often overlooked is the fact that new
automated devices also create new demands for the individual and groups of
practitioners responsible for operating and managing these systems. The new
demands can include new or changed tasks (setup, operating sequences, etc.), and
new cognitive demands are created as well. There are new knowledge requirements
(e.g., how the automation functions), new communication tasks (e.g., instructing
the automation in a particular case), new data management tasks (e.g., finding the
relevant page within the CDU page architecture), new attentional demands (tracking
the state of automation), and new forms of error or failure (e.g., mode error).
(1992, p. 17)
This kind of role sharing and interaction pattern has the long term effect of removing the
pilot from the loop and decreasing system awareness especially as feedback on automation
status and behaviour is poor and difficult to obtain.
While our goals are not to ignore these very important problems, we would like to draw the
attention to the problems specifically related to the interfacing of functions and agents in modern
aircrafts. We especially believe that some of the problems encountered in modern glass-cockpits
* " The capacity of the human mind for formulatingand solving complex problems is very small compared
with the size of the problems whose solutions is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world
- or even for a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality. "
(Simon, 1957,quoted by Reason, 1987, p. 76).
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appear because the "agent" character of some resources has not been sufficiently recognized,
and that in some case agents have been interfaced as if they were mere functions.
As will be shown later, the main question behind usable interface design is:
How do we provide the user with the necessary knowledge and the means to interact
with the resources in order to act and react in the worm according to goals or tasks ?
We will first show how the approach adopted by the classical HCI community regarding the
interfacing of functions on a static setting has succeeded in its attempts to answer to this
question, how it has provided designers with principles to support evaluation, certification and
designs methodologies and, in the end, end-users with highly usable forms of interfaces. We
will then show how such a strategy could be applied to interface agents in dynamic worlds.
In the end, we will have provided the reader with two sets of principles, respectively for
functions and agents interfacing, that could influence the way evaluation and certification of
interfaces incorporating these two types of resources are performed.
Interfacing Functions in Static Problem-Spaces: Classical HCI
The now classical domain of Human-Computer Interaction has proven its ability to solve
interfacing problems with powerful computerized tools.
Such successes must be related to three factors:
a) cognitive theories of human-computer interaction have been produced
b) some general principles that interfaces have to verify have been defined, either as a
subproduct of the cognitive the.odes of the interaction, or of empirical data (controlled
experiments, analysis of errors, etc.)
c) some generic forms of interfaces conforming to these principles have been designed
and have received a wide acceptance.
Cognitive Theories of Interaction
Cognitive theories of interaction between users and computers have existed for several years
now. Strongly influenced by the early attempts of Artificial Intelligence to produce models of
problem-solving and planning (such as GPS, Newell & Simon, 1972), nearly all rely on the
same approach and assume that the user achieves goals by solving sub-goals in a divide-and-
conquer fashion (Dix, Finlay, Abowd, & Beale, 1993): GOMS (Card, Moran,.& Newell,
1983), CCT (Kieras & Poison, 1985), TAG (Payne & Green, 1986).
The GOMS model, which has served as the basis for major research in cognitive modelling
applied to HCI (Dix et al., 1993), considers for example that an interaction situation can be
described in terms of Goals, Operators, Methods and Selection.
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Goals are the user goals; they are "what has to be achieved".
Operators are the basic operations the user can perform to affect the system state
(represented as state transitions).
Methods describe how alternative sub-goals decomposition can help the user to reach
the same goal.
Selection rules attempt to predict which methods the user will use to reach goals
depending on the user itself and the state of the system.
In such models, the computer is clearly considered as a static setting; that is, one whose state
only changes as an effect of the actions of the user considered as the application of operators.
To illustrate how the distinction between a static problem-space and its related operators or
functions encounter personal experience, we will analyse how the file management problem is
treated on most personal computers.
Interface designers confronted with the file management problem have to define ways to
represent files as they appear on some physical support (a hard disk for example) and provide
users with the means to manipulate them. Files are usually organised on this support according
to a hierarchical structure (a tree). This structure is static; it remains as it is unless the user
attempts a modification. Files and directories can be moved, copied or deleted. Individual flies
can be transformed thanks to applications (word processors, spreadsheets,...) that change their
internal structure. All these operations are under control of the user.
The desktop metaphor (Booth, 1989) elegantly solves this problem:
a) The static problem-space: the desktop metaphor is a possible alternative to the
problem of representing static problem-space. Files and directories are represented
by icons or names in lists. Files which are in use are represented by open windows.
b) Functions or operators: most of the functions are accessible directly on the desktop
(Direct Manipulation Interface; Hutchins, Hollan, & Norman, 1986). File
displacement and deletion are operated through moves of the mouse or function
activations through menus. Activation of an application on a specific file is possible
through double-clicking commands or menus.
General Principles
Thanks to the coherent framework provided by the analogy with problem-solving or planning
on static problem-space, it is possible to produce a structured and theoretically sound (contrarily
to most of the guidelines) set of principles about properties of usable interfaces.
These principles rely on four underlying ideas.
a) In order to act efficiently on a static problem-space, the user must have access to some
knowledge about the problem-space itself and the functions that can be applied.
- The user must be able to assess the current state of the problem-space;
- He/she must know which operators or functions can be applied to this state; and
- What transition will occur if an operator or function is applied;
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Withoutthisinformation,thegoalscannotbereached(onewouldsay,intermsofproblem-
solvingorplanningtheory,thatheproblemcannotbesolved).
b)Partof thisknowledgeisrelatedto thestaticproblem-spaceandtheotherpart
concernsthefunctionsthemselves.
c) The knowledge required to interact with static problem-spaces can be distributed
within the interface/user system. Well designed interfaces provide the user with a lot
of knowledge about the current state of the problem-space (visibility), the functions
that can be applied (availability) and the related transitions (predictability). To
paraphrase Norman (Norman, 1988) in such interfaces, "information is in the world."
In badly designed interfaces, the current state of the problem-space is not visible and a
lot has to be remembered (in short-term memory). It is hard to tell which functions can
be applied or what will be their effects. In such interfaces, "information is in the
head."
d) Principles (necessary principles) that warrant the presence and availability of the
necessary knowledge can be stated. Secondary principles, considered less important,
can be proposed to indicate how to make the interface more usable or how to support
the user in its tasks.
Principles for Static Problem-Spaces
Visibility. Can I see what 1 need to see? The goal of this principle is to ensure that the user
might have a full and accurate representation of the current state of the problem-space.
Interpretability - Do I see what I'm supposed to see? It is not sufficient for the user to have
access to a representation of the problem-space. A representation conveys some meaning about
some real situation which is abstracted into symbols, and have to be interpreted by the user.
This principle ensures that the user correctly interprets the representation. Some simpler but
nevertheless essential principles usually support interpretability: consistency or coherence of the
symbols and of their interpretation, familiarity and generalizability of the symbols.
Flexibility - May I change the way I see? The possibility of tuning the representations, in
particular to modulate the informational flow according to the bandwidth of the human
cognitive processing limitations and the particular needs of the current situation, is a specially
desirable property of usable interfaces.
Reliability - Is this thing the real picture? This one deals with a critical feature of any interface.
It must be reliable, and the user must be confident with the information it provides or the
resource it helps to use. When applied to problem-space representation, the reliability principle
wonders whether the representation presented to the user constitutes an accurate and reliable
representation of the problem-space and how this can be assessed by the user itself.
Learnability - Can I avoid headaches? This principle is important because of the way users
accept new products or interfaces is influenced by their learnability. In the case of a static
problem-space representation, how easily can the user learn the rules that help to interpret
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correctlytherepresentation.O ceagain,simplerprinciplessuchasconsistency,familiarityand
generalizibilitystronglycontributetofacilitatel arnability.
Principles for Functions
Availability - What can I do? In order to apply functions on the static problem-space as if they
were operators, the user must be in a position to decide which functions can be applied on the
problem-space. General availability refers to the complete list of functions provided by the
interface. Local availability concerns the limited list of functions applicable to specific states of
the problem-space. Knowledge concerning both types of availability should be accessible to
the user.
Accessibility - How can I do it? Once the user has gained some knowledge about which
functions can be applied on the problem-space and has chosen one or a sequence of them to
apply, he/she has to specify it for the interface. Knowledge about how to access functions and
how to activate them on the correct objects should available to the user. Consistency, familiarity
and generazibility are once again among the simpler principles that help the user to access
functions.
Predictability - What will happen? Predictability is without any doubts the essential principle to
conform to. In problem-solving and planning models, the ability to predict how the state of the
world will change when an operator iterface with a machine is crucial for resolution or task
satisfaction. The user must possess the necessary knowledge to be able to generate plans or
sequences of actions on the interface that in the end will meet its goals. Modes, if any, have to
be made visible to the user because they influence, by definition, the way functions behave and
thus constitute a threat to predictability.
Feedback - How is it working and what are the effects? Feedback is essential because it permits
the user to assess that the intended state has been reached, and hence that the activated function
has been applied correctly. Feedback is thus associated to error detection, but also to the ability
to learn (see learnability principle) the necessary knowledge to predict functional effects (see
predictability principle). Two forms of feedback are usually encountered. The first type
concerns the visibility of the function status (progression bars) and help to confirm that the
access to the function has been successful (see accessibility principle). The second type of
feedback ensures that the effects of the activated functions are visible. In the strictest sense, this
second form of feedback is more concerned with visibility of the representations, and is thus
not a pure functional principle.
Controllability - How the hell do 1 stop this thing from erasing my hard disk? As dramatically
stated by the previous sentence, controllability is a particularly desirable feature. Nevertheless,
in general, interfaces provide a very limited set of interactions between a running function and
the user (otherwise, it would be an agent). Control is usually limited to interruption (either
temporary or definitive) of the function execution.
Flexibility - Can I do it the other way? Users are not machines, and they are faced with very
variable tasks. Moreover, users all differ. They have different backgrounds, different cognitive
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styles, and usually different goals. For such reasons, while not resorting to the major,
necessary principles, flexibility is generally appreciated by users.
Automatibility - Can I automate this sequence of operations? There are two facets to
automatibility whose advantages are obvious. Machine-supported automatibility refers to the
possibility for the user to define "macros," automated sequences of functional activations, with
or without parameters. Cognitive automatibility concerns the ability of the user to automate the
motor and cognitive processes that support its access to functions. This form of automatibility
is strongly conditioned by good visibility of the problem-space and easy and consistent access
to functions.
Task Conformance - Does it really cover all my needs? This principle concerns the scope of the
available functions regarding the nature of the task they are to perform. It can be considered
from a general point of view (the global availability) or more locally according to specific
situations (the local availability compared to the local task): i.e., is the function available when
needed?
Error Management - What ifl err? Users are fallible (Reason, 1990). Good interfaces have to
take this into account and exhibit error resistance (prevent users to make errors, e.g. Masson &
De Keyser, in press) and error tolerance (help users to correct effects of errors through
reversibility, escapability, recoverability of function applications).
Reliability - Is this stuff reaUy working as it is supposed to? While being extremely reliable
systems, modern computers are nevertheless mere material human artifacts and consequently
suffer from design errors as well as from the usually hidden effects of the second-law of
thermodynamics. At the software level, bugs are present in any complex application. At the
hardware level, problems and troubles sometimes occur due to heat, dust, fatigue or even
failure of a component. Interfaces should furnish the user with means to ensure that the
functional resources effectively affect the state of the problem-space as reflected by its
representation and the different feedback mechanisms.
Learnability - Can I avoid headaches? Leamability of functions is essential. As already stated
for problem-space related principles, it is generally a necessary condition for the acceptance of
an interface. Several aspects can be learned and thus lead the user to eliminate exploratory or
information seeking behaviors. Every piece of the necessary knowledge related to the primary
principles (availability, accessibility, predictability) can be learned. Some rules that help the
user to deduce such essential pieces of information from the representation of the problem-
space can also be abstracted and then greatly contribute to simplify the activation of the
functional resources; hence the pervasive character of the consistency principle.
Generic Forms of Interfaces
Classical HCI has also succeeded in its attempts to apply these principles to interface design.
Graphical user interfaces, and especially WIMP (windows, icons, menus and pointers)
interfaces (Dix et al., 1993), which constitute the standard interface for interactive computer
systems (Macintosh, Windows-based IBMs and compatibles, desktop workstations) have
proven their usability to millions of end-users.
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Suchkindsofinterfacesindeedprovideuserswithanexcellentvisibilityoverthecurrent
stateof theproblem-space(e.g.,thedesktopof theMacintosh)aswellwithconsistentand
familiarrulestointerprettherepresentation(thedesktopmetaphor).Usershabituallyhavethe
opportunitytotunetheserepresentations(e.g.,differentwaystodisplayfilesinadirectory)
andthiscontributestotheinterfaceflexibility.Moreover,suchinterfacesarehighlylearnable,
especiallybecauseoftheircoherentandmetaphoricnature.
GUIsandWIMPsequallyperformattheirbestregardingfunctions.Availabilityisusually
verywelldocumentedbytheinterface.Thisisaleastrueofthemostusedfunctions.Less
commonfunctionsarenotwellknowntousers,especiallyincaseofverypowerfultoolssuch
asword-processorsthatprovideuserswithhundredsoffunctions.Accessibilitysextremely
good,thankstothemouseanditsclickingcommandsandtomenus(thatalsocontributeo
availability).Predictabilityisgood(atleastforsimpleoperationsonthedesktop)becauseofthe
coherenceof theaccessrulesandthealreadyquotedmetaphoricnatureof theinterface.
Feedbackis immediate,butrestrictedto objectsvisibleonthedesktop.Controllabilityis
limited,butit isenhancedforfunctionsthathavedestructiveeffectsonthedesktop.Flexibility
isusuallygood,thankstotheseveraldifferentwaystoperformoperations(directlyonthe
desktoporthroughmenus).Macrosareprovidedasdefaultfeaturesorcanbeaddedthanksto
dedicatedapplications.Taskconformanceistheprinciplewherethesegraphicalinterfacesareat
theirworst:hepossiblescopeofwhatcanbedoneissomehowlimited,especiallyif compared
toverypowerfulcommand-languages(e.g.Unix)dedicatedtofilesmanagement.Errorsare
handledifferentlyby themanufacturersof commonGUIs.Operationsthatimplya
displacementoffilesbetweentwoplaces(amoveoperation)cangenerallybeundone,butfile
deletionissometimesanoperationthatcannotbereversedwithoutspecificallydedicatedtools.
Leamability,finally,isusuallyextremelygood(perhapsit isintheendthemainreasonforthe
successoftheseinterfaceswithinacomputer-illiteratepopulation)especiallybecauseoftheso-
praisedconsistencyof theinterface(evenbetweenapplications)andthemetaphorf the
desktop.
Interfacing Agents in Dynamic Problem-Spaces: HCI Goes to the
Real World
We have carefully analysed the approach followed by classical HCI to solve the problems
related to the interfacing of functions in static problem-spaces. Now we would like to see how
such a strategy can be applied to interface agents in dynamic problem-spaces. According to
other authors (Kay, 1990; Laurel, 1990), the interfacing of agents is the challenge of
tomorrow's HCI. We already have shown how agents constitute invaluable resources for
users, operators or pilots in their respective tasks. That is why manufacturers and designers
have introduced them at several different levels of automation used in process control.
Cognitive Theories of Interaction
There has been for a few years an emergent interest about ideas related to the integration of a
distributed work or processing force into a coherent and goal-oriented whole. Computer
Science, for example, has already produced numerous formal studies about parallel processing
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and synchronization problems. Distributed Artificial Intelligence (DAI) aims designing systems
or societies of agents (multi-agent systems) that collectively exhibit the ability to solve complex
problems with more robustness than classical approaches (Maes, 1990). On the linguistic side,
Winograd and Flores (Flores, Graves, Hartfield, & Winograd, 1988) have developed
linguistic-based theoretical perspectives for analysing group actions. Coordination Theory
(Malone & Crowston, 1990) as a general and abstract theory tries to establish the connections
between several different disciplines that are concerned with similar coordination phenomena.
On the applied side, Computer Support to Cooperative Work (CSCW) is aiming at providing
organizations or groups of users with better ways and tools to work together (Dix et al., 1993).
As demonstrated by the next excerpts, concerns about agents and modelling human/agent
interaction have even been expressed in aeronautics by human factors authors.
Pilots were surprised when the aircraft did not respond as expected; they did not
realize or understand why their instructions to the automation had not resulted in the
desired change. In some sense, this is a good example to show how pilots try to
communicate with the system in a way analogous to communication with another
human agent. They assume that entering the desired target value is sufficient for the
system (as it would be for a human crew member) to understand that it is supposed
to achieve this new target and how it is supposed to do so in detail. (Sarter &
Woods, 1993, p. 12)
(This) direction is to consider supervisory control of automated resources as a kind
of cooperative or distributed multi-agent architecture. (Sarter & Woods, 1993, p. 12)
Despite these efforts and remarks, there is nothing today like a single and coherent body of
theory about coordination between agents (Malone & Crowston, 1990), and it hard to think of
any integrated cognitive theory of interaction between humans considered as agents, or between
humans and automated agents. Nevertheless, there is more and more awareness of the
similarities between the problems encountered by researchers involved in these approaches to
cooperative systems as is wimessed by the increasing number of workshops or conferences on
the topic. On the cognitive side, expectations about future progress will rely on domains such
as social or developmental cognitive psychology as well as psycholinguistics to produce a
coherent and integrated theory of human interaction with agents.
General Principles
Designers faced with the problem of interfacing agents are still left without the sort of powerful
framework they used to rely on when designing functional interfaces. Nevertheless, some
important principles that interfaces with agents should verify can already be stated, thanks to
extensions of the basic principles for functional interfaces, reflections about the necessary
knowledge required for usable interaction, and to recommendations formulated by analysts
when incidents with such interfaces were reported. We will thus try to rely on these excellent
studies of problems and incidents encountered with automation in modem glass-cockpits as
major sources for defining general principles.
On the epistemic side, it is at least clear from a formal point of view that more knowledge
(distributed between the user and the interface) is needed to control a dynamic problem-space
than a static one. Anticipatory behaviors, of which some researches have shown the heuristic
value (Van Daele, 1992), are only possible if the user, operator or pilot has some knowledge or
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abilityto predicthowthecontrolledsystemwill naturallyevolveif noactionis taken.
Interfacestodynamicworldsorproblem-spacesshouldprovidetheuserwithsuchknowledge
orresource(seethepredictabilityprinciplefordynamicproblem-spaces).
Moreknowledgeisalsoneededtointeractwithagentshanwithfunctions.Agentscanbeof
numerousdifferenttypesanddifferintermsofcomplexity(rangingfromreactivetocognitive
agents;Erceau&Ferber,1991).Whatevertheimportanceofsuchfactors,themaindifficulty
withagentscertainlycomesfromtheirflexibility(complexagentscanexhibitdifferent
behavioursinsimilarsituations)andfromtheirautonomy(agentsincorporatetheirownlogic
behindfunctionalctivationandactautonomouslyontheworld).Asaconsequence,agents
mustbeconsideredasgenerallyesspredictabler sourcesthanfunctions.
Respective Scopes or Competences and Cooperative Modes. A supplementary and rather
essential distinction must be introduced before devoting some attention to the principles. It
concerns the distribution of competence between the user, the operator or pilot and the agent.
To use a multi-agent terminology, one would say that only two cooperation modes are possible:
either the job is done by the function or it is done by the user. The situation is quite different
with agents. Because such resources display possibilities for an extended amount of
controllability these resources provide the capability for more complex cooperation modes.
Three classes of cooperation modes have to be considered:
a) The job is done by the user. The agent is not active or works on another task.
This corresponds to the concept of "direct manual control."
According to Billings (1991, p. 27) direct manual control is characterized by the pilot's
direct authority over systems, manual control using raw data, unaided decision making and
manual communications.
However, as pointed out by the author, no modern aircraft can be operated entirely on that
mode. "Indeed, an aircraft operated even by direct manual control may incorporate many kinds
of control automation, such as yaw dampers, a pitch trim compensator, automated
configuration warning devices, etc." (Billings, 1991, p. 26). For example, landing gear
retraction and extension are still manually operated in all transport aircrafts.
b) The job is done by the agent. The user is not active or works on another task.
This is precisely the meaning of the "autonomous operation" concept. As summarized from
Billings, autonomous operation is characterized by the fact that the pilot has no role to play in
operation, that the pilot has normally no reason to intervene and that the monitoring is limited to
fault detection (Billings, 1991, p. 26).
Until the introduction of the A320 and MD11, very complex systems were operated in a full
autonomous fashion. In those new aircraft, however, major systems operate this way. For
example, in the MDll, failure detection and subsystem reconfiguration are performed
autonomously. Longitudinal stability and control wheel steering are also autonomous
operations.
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Global Task
Agent
(a) agent fully in charge
Global Task
User
(b) user fully in charge
Figure 2: Agent and User interaction.
c) The job is done by both the user and the agent. Each of them has its own part of the
task. Two situations have to be distinguished:
1) The two tasks are exclusive. This occurs for example when the agent and the
user work on two different sub-systems. If the two tasks are interdependent (the
two sub-systems interact) then the agent and the user have to synchronize their
actions.
An example of such a sharing pattern is given by Billings: "the pilot may elect to
have the autopilot perform only the most basic functions: pitch, roll and yaw
control...he or she may direct the automation to maintain or alter heading, altitude or
speed, or may direct the autopilot to capture and follow navigation paths, either
horizontal or vertical...In all cases however, the aircraft is carrying out a set of
tactical directions supplied by the pilot. It will not deviate from these directions
unless it is capable of executing them." (1991)
2) The two tasks share a common part. This could occur when the agent and the
user do work on the same sub-systems. In such cases, conflicts are likely to arise,
and resolution techniques have to be provided.
For example, in the 320, the flight control system incorporates an envelope
limitation system that operates at all times and interacts with pilot's commands, in
order to guarantee that safety barriers are not overcome. For example, bank angle,
pitch and angle of attack cannot be exceeded by the pilot unless the flight control
computer is turned off.
Global Task
@@
Global Task
(c.1) exclusive scopes (c.2) common scopes
Figure 3: Agent and User scopes.
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Moreover; cooperation modes with agents cannot solely be considered in a static perspective
(they are fixed and cannot be changed over a task session or a flight). Dynamic mode changes
are also observed in modem cockpits (modes change over the course of a task session, either
through agent or user instruction).
An important characteristic of automatic flight-path control is the high degree of
dynamism. Transitions between modes of control occur in response to pilot input and
changes in flight status. Automatic mode changes can occur when a target value is
reached (e.g., when levelling off at a target altitude), or they can occur based on
protections limits (i.e., to prevent or correct pilot input that puts the aircraft in an unsafe
condition). (Saner & Woods, 1992, p. 306)
For such reasons, as stated by Billings, feedback (see the feedback principle) should be
given to the user or pilot whenever an important mode change occurs.
Automation should never permit a situation in which "no one is in charge"; pilots must
always "aviate" even if they have delegated control to the autopilot. It is for this reason
that autopilot disconnects are usually announced by both visual and aural alerting signals
(Billings, 1991, p. 85).
To confirm the importance of issues related to cooperation modes, Saner and Woods also
describe how the pilot's inability to dynamically change modes can lead to some drastic
measures.
During the final descent, the pilots were unable to deselect the APPR mode after localizer
and glideslope capture when ATC suddenly requested that the aircraft maintain the
current altitude and initiate a 90° left turn for spacing. They tried to select the ALT HOLD
and HDG SEL modes on the MCP to disengage the APPR mode and comply with the
clearance, but neither mode would engage and replace the APPR mode. They finally
turned off all autoglide systems (Saner & Woods, 1992, p. 311).
This leads us to some critical remarks about the way evaluation or certification of agent-
based interface relying on principles should be performed.
• The analysis should begin with a very careful study of the possible cooperation modes
between the user and the agent.
• It should detail who is in control of
- The cooperation mode changes
- The relative scopes of the user and the agent within a given cooperation mode (task
migrability).
• For each possible cooperation mode, consider how the duality user/agent is positioned
according to the principles. However, due to the very different ways the task is
conducted in different cooperation modes, principles have to be applied with some
nuances in mind and be related to the current specificities of the current mode.
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In a short-response time agent (a regulator), whose capabilities are far beyond those of the
pilot, the cooperation mode is such that the task is exclusively under the agent control. The
main principles in this situation are a) reliability, and b) the capability for the pilot to assess that
the agent is working in its competence domain. Principles such as predictability, that used to be
essential for functional resources, are hereby not necessary (e.g. the gyroscopic stabilizer of
Maxim, 1891, the stability augmentation system of Wright, 1907, and their successors in
modem autopilots).
Principles for Dynamic Problem-Spaces
Visibility - Can I see what I need to see? Visibility of the problem-space acquires hereby a
special status due to its dynamicity. In static problem-spaces where the world does not change
spontaneously, the user or pilot can rely on short-term memory to maintain awareness and
orientation. In dynamic problem-space, updating is necessary and this is only possible through
predictions or observations of the future states. In a particularly complex dynamic context with
heavy task constraints, the concept must even be extended to meet the notion of "situation
awareness" (Sarter & Woods, 1991). In such situations, it is not enough to provide the user
with the means to perceive the state of the problem-state, but also to ensure that it will be
attendecL
Situation awareness has recently gained considerable attention as a performance-related
psychological concept. This is especially true in the aviation domain where it is
considered an essential prerequisite for the safe operation of the complex dynamic system
"aircraft." There are concerns, however, that inappropriately designed automatic systems
introduced to advanced flight desks may reduce situation awareness and thereby put
aviation safety at risk. (Sarter & Woods, 1991, p. 45)
The problem of the amount of information that must be visible is also addressed by Billings:
"How much information is enough? How much is too much?" Though pilots always
want more information, they are not always able to assimilate it. (Billings, 1991, p. 46)
As pointed out by the author, such a question should be answered (as suggested above)
according to a clear consideration of the cooperative mode between the pilot and the agent and
their respective involvement in the control task.
Pilots need much less information when subsystems are working properly than when
they are malfunctioning (Billings, 1991, p. 46)
Interpretability - Do I see what I'm supposed to see? No significant difference with its
functional counterpart.
Flexibility - May I change the way I see? Flexibility applied to the representation of the
dynamic problem-space means that the user or pilot is capable of adapting this representation to
its current or future needs. Such a possibility is present in several subsystems displays
(zooming features) of glass-cockpits.
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Predictability - What will happen if l stop acting? The new principle is based as already stated
on the heuristic value of predictory or anticipatory behaviours in most dynamic control
situations (Van Daele, 1992). Good interfaces for dynamic problem-spaces should provide the
users with means to anticipate future states. Several examples of such an approach already exist
in aeronautic contexts. On ATC radar control screens, airplanes can be represented with small
tails indicating their speed and direction. This helps operators to anticipate their future
trajectory. On TCAS screens, vertical speeds of surrounding airplanes are represented by small
arrows. In general any graphical representation of a trend indicator can contribute to the
predictability of the dynamic problem-space.
Relial_lity- Is this thing the real picture ? The problem of reliability related to dynamic problem-
space is perfectly stated by Billings:
It must be kept in mind that sensors, processing equipment or display generators can fail,
and that when incorrect information is presented, or correct information is not presented,
there is the potential for confusion in the minds of pilots. (1991, p.40)
An interface on a dynamic problem-space should help the user to ensure that it functions
correctly, both in its ability to display correct and accurate information about the real state of the
monitored systems and in its ability to inform the user about future states (support to
predictability principle). Redundancy of display equipments or availability of displays related to
interdependent subsystems can help the user or pilot to ensure that the informational interfaces
are functioning correctly thanks to comparison or inter-display coherence checking.
Learnability - Can I avoid headaches? Here, again, there is no significant difference with
functional counterpart.
Critical State Assessment- Is this the right place to stand still? This new principle concerns the
peculiar problems associated with dynamic problem-spaces. In such spaces, states are rarely
equivalent. Some of them require special care or attention, either because the monitored system
ventures within space regions where irreversible damages could be observed, or because its
intrinsic dynamic could lead the user or pilot to lose control. Interfaces provide critical state
assessment support users and help them to enhance their performance.
Principles for Agents
Availability - What can I do? Availability as such refers to the capability the user has to decide
whether a resource exists and is available. Users or pilots should be informed of the different
agents they might use as resources (global availability) as well as when these can effectively be
used (local availability), and in which cooperative modes.
Accessibility - How can I do it? Users or pilots willing to use an agent as a resource should
have access to some knowledge about how to activate and configure it in the cooperative mode
of their choice (if they are in control of this variable).
Predictability - What will happen ? Predictability is, without a doubt, one of the principles that
must be considered with extended caution when trying to interface agents. As previously stated,
agents are autonomous systems. They consequently present less predictable behaviours than
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functions.Numerousexamplesofincidentsrelatedtoalackofpredictabilityofsomeagentsin
glass-cockpitshavealreadybeenreported.SarterandWoods(1992)haverealizedastudy
throughaquestionnaireaskingpilotstodescribeinstancesinwhichFMSbehaviourwas
surprising,andto reportmodesandfeaturesof FMSoperationsthatwerepoorlyor not
understood.135B-737-300linepilotsfromanairlinecompanyparticipatedto thatsurvey(Sarter& Woods,1992).
Pilotsindicatedthatthealgorithmsunderlyingthecalculation of a VNAV are not
transparent to them. They cannot vizualize the intended path; therefore, they are
sometimes unable to anticipate or understand VNAV activities initiated to maintain target
parameters...Several pilots reported that they have been surprised by VNAV when it
failed to start the descent on reaching the top-of-descent (TOD) point...
The problem the user or pilot is faced with is one of agent modelling. Designers must ensure
that they provide the user with a correct model of the agent. Two principal classes of models
govern the theories about agents: mechanistic models and intentional models. In mechanistic
models, the user relies on a kind of finite-state automaton approximation of the agent whose
behaviour can be predicted thanks to the awareness of relations between some internal
parameters or variables of the agent, the input it is actually processing and the resulting
behaviour. In intentional models of agents, the user predicts future behaviors of the agent on
the base of its goals or intentions. Consequently, and whatever the type of model hold by the
user (depending on the type and complexity of the agent), it seems essential that any important
autonomous change that might modify the way the agent will behave in the near future (a
change of mode in mechanistic models or a change of goals or intentions in intentional models)
is reported to the user.
Scope or Competence Awareness - What can this thing do and when? This new and essential
principle concerns the competence of the agent: what it (can) do and in which circumstances.
With purely functional resources, competence awareness is close to predictability. Functions
induce simple state-transitions (what is does) from the states upon which they apply (in which
circumstances). Due to the extended flexibility and autonomy of agents, this similarity does not
appear and a new principle has to be introduced. Scope awareness is extremely important, at
least when the user or pilot is in control of the cooperation modes and of task migrability: the
pilot must be able to assess that the agent is performing reliably (reliability principle) and
correctly (adapted to the task) in its domain (scope awareness) of competence. Designers must
consequently provide the user or pilot with this knowledge through the interface,
documentation, and/or training courses.
Feedback - How is it working and what are the effects? This is another essential principle for
agents. Due to the new problems introduced with predictability of the agent and the correlated
needs to model its behavior, the visibility of agent status increases in importance. As already
reported, mode awareness (in mechanical models) is a condition for real cooperative work
between the user or pilot and the agent.
Pilots reported that they are surprised by uncommanded mode transitions that occur
on reaching a target state or for protection purposes. Most often, the reports referred
to the automatic reversion from vertical speed mode to LVL CHG mode, which
occurs if the airspeed deviates from the target range due to an excessive rate of climb
or descent.
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Pilots'reportsseemtoindicatehatsuchuncommandedchangesaredifficulttotrack
givencurrentcockpitdisplaysandindications.(Sarter&Woods,1992,p.31I)
Visibilityoftheagent'seffectsareofequalimportance.Becauseagentsdisplayautonomy,
anychangeintroducedonthedynamicproblem-spacebytheagentshouldbereportedorbeat
leastvisibletotheuser,especiallyincooperativemodeswhereboththeagentandtheuserare
inchargeofthesametask.It isalsoduetothisvisibilitythatheadequacyofthedecisionto
activateheagentaswellasitsreliabilitycanbeassessed.SeealsoBillings(1991,p.85)and
theconceptof"fail-passive"controlautomationsituationsthatdescribehazardousconditions
wherevisibilityoftheagenteffectsi lowered.
Controllability - How the hell do I stop this thing grounding my airplane? Because of the
autonomy of agents, and their ability to induce disastrous effects on the controlled problem-
space, controllability should remain high in every circumstances. Woods describes how
"clumsy automation" can contribute to lower controllability in circumstance where it is
especially needed.
Clumsy automation is a form of poor coordination between the human and machine in the
control of dynamic processes where the benefits of the new technology (i.e. additional
tasks, forcing the user to adopt new cognitive strategies, new communication burdens,
new attentional demands) occur during periods of peak workload, high criticality or high
tempo operations. (Cook et al., 1990 ; Sarter & Woods, in press)
Significantly, deficits like this can create opportunities for new kinds of human error and
new paths to system breakdown that did not exist in simpler systems. (Woods, Cook, &
Sarter, 1993) (Woods, 1993, p. 2)
It is a clear evidence that users or pilots should have the capability to disengage automation
(agents) or at least change the current cooperative mode to some mode where they are more
involved whenever they think it is needed. Billings states this very precisely:
Premise
The pilot bears the ultimate responsibility for the safety of
any flight operation
Axiom
The human operator must be in command
Principles of Human-Centered Automation (extract). (Billings, 1991, p. 12)
The same author expresses serious concerns about recent examples of violation of such
principles. The flight control system of the A320 and its envelope limitation operate at all times:
they cannot be disengaged by the pilot. In the MD-11, major aircraft systems operate
autonomously to a large extent:
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...(civil aircraft) do on occasion have to take violent evasive action, and they may on
extremely rare occasions need control or power authority up to (or even beyond)
structural and engine limits to cope with very serious failures. The issue is whether the
pilot, who is ultimately responsible for safe mission completion, should be permitted to
operate to or even beyond airplane limits... (Billings 1991, p. 29)
Error Management - What if I err? As pointed by Billings, system operation errors are
responsible for roughly two-thirds of air carrier accidents (1991, p. 24). It thus mandatory, as
for functions, to design error-resistant and error-tolerant agent interfaces that attempt to
minimize the effects of human error. Monitoring capabilities into the automation, system
envelope limitations and procedural control are among the currently investigated techniques to
enhance safety.
Task Conformance - Does it really cover all my needs? Here again, there is no significant
difference with functional counterpart.
Flexibility- Can ldo it the other way? The multiplicity of ways a given resource can be used is
usually a rather desirable feature, especially because it provides the user or pilot with a choice
within several different strategies to achieve the same goal.
For example, an automated cockpit system such as the Flight Management System
(FMS) is flexible in the sense that it provides pilots with a large number of functions and
options for carrying out a given flight task under different circumstances. There are at
least five different methods that the pilot could invoke to change altitude (Sarter &
Woods, 1993, p. 2).
However, with complex cooperative agents, flexibility can strongly contribute to the
"clumsiness" of automation and lead to very serious problems, as is witnessed by the same
authors:
This flexibility is usually portrayed as a benefit that allows the pilot to select the mode
best suited to a particular flight situation. But this flexibility has a price: the pilots must
know about the functions of the different modes, how to coordinate which mode to use
when, how to "blumplessly" switch from one mode to another, how each mode is set up
to fly the aircraft, and he has to keep track of which mode is active. These new cognitive
demands can easily congruate at high tempo and high criticality periods of device use
thereby adding new workload at precisely those time periods where practitioners are most
in need of effective support systems.
Clumsy use of technological possibilities, such as the proliferation of modes, creates
the potential for new forms of human-machine system failure and new paths towards
critical incidents, e.g. the air crashes at Bangalore (e.g., Lenorovitz, 1990) and
Strasbourg (Monnier, 1992) (Salter & Woods, 1993, p. 2).
Reliability -Is this stuff really working as it pretends? The reliability principle is extremely
important with agents, especially because of their capability for autonomy and of the
corresponding tendency of users to rely blindly on them.
As an example of overconfidence in automation, we would like to mention the accident of
Scandinavian Airlines DC-10-30 occurred at Kennedy Airport on February 2, 1984. In this
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accident,theairplanetouchedown4700ft beyondthelimitofan8400ft runway,wasthen
steeredtotherightandlandedinwater600ftbeyondtherunway.Theaccidentwasduemainly
duetoafailureofthethrottlestorespondtotheautothrottlespeedcontrolsystemcommands
andtotheexcessiveconfidenceoftheCaptainthereliabilityofthatautothrottlesystem,in
spiteofaonemonthistoryofmalfunctions.A notedbytheNTSBamongothercauses,the
"performancewaseitheraberrantorrepresentsa endencyforthecrewtobecomplacentand
over-relyonautomatedsystems"(quotedbyBillings,1991,p. 99).
AspointedoutbyBillings,theabilitytoassessreliabilityis relatedto visibilityof the
problem-space,andtopredictabilityoftheagentbehaviour(eitherbasedonmechanicalor
intentionalmodels).
It isthusnecessarythatthepilotbeawarebothofthefunction(ordysfunction)ofthe
automatedsystem,andoftheresultsofitslabors,onanongoingbasis,if thepilotisto
understandwhycomplexautomatedsystemsaredoingwhatheyaredoing(Billings,
1991,p.83).
Howeversuchastrategymightfailsimplybecauseofthestableconditionthecontrolled
processi in.Automaticmonitoringoftheagentreliabilityandvisibilityonitsstatusi badly
neededinsuchsituations.
"Fail-passive"controlautomationrepresentsaparticularpotentialhazard,in thatits
failuremaynotchangeaircraftperformanceatthetimeif theairplaneis in stable
condition.Suchfailuresmustbeannouncedunambiguouslytoinsurethatthepilots
immediatelyresumeactivecontrolofthemachine(Billings,1991,p.85).
Learnability - Can I avoid headaches? As with functional interfaces, comments must be made
about the strong relation between the learnability of agent interfaces and their success measured
in term of acceptance by users as means to access the full capabilities of the resources, in a safe
and error-free fashion, and without the side-effects (clumsy automation, shift or loss of
expertise, etc.) usually observed. Given the amount of knowledge that must be learned to
interact cooperatively with an agent (this point will be developed later), learnability of agent
interface must be (very) high. A few possible solutions will be described in the section about
generic interfaces design.
Generic Forms of Interfaces
To begin with interfaces, some special points must be made about the amazing amount of
knowledge required to interact fruitfully with agents. Users or pilots must be educated about the
availability of agents (when they can be used), their accessibility (how they can be used), their
scope or competence (what they can and can not do), their predictability (how they will behave
or act on the problem-space under control), and the related mental models of their functioning,
and finally about their controllability (how can they be controlled). Moreover, they must
develop skills or mental processes dealing with how to communicate with them, how to
evaluate their reliability through predictability and visibility of the problem-space, how to use or
require feedbacks to enhance predictability itself, how to manage errors when they occur, etc.
342 Javaux,Masson,&DeKeyser
Togainthisknowledgeordevelopthemeanstoaccessit isanextremely important task
user/pilot face (hence, the "clumsy automation" problems and shift of workload toward more
cognitive tasks reported by many authors). Moreover, to add to the task, the knowledge is
required for each agent the user or pilot is interfaced with!
Our claim is that many problems described in modem glass-cockpits could be avoided if
these simple - but overwhelming - considerations were taken into account.
A possible and promising solution, as already demonstrated with function interfacing
through Direct Manipulation and metaphoric interfaces, is to provide the user with a tot of the
necessary knowledge embedded in the interface itself and with the means to extract it whenever
needed. Whether such interfaces should rely on graphical DMI-type interfaces or even more
futuristic solutions (e.g., virtual realities) remains an open question.
A second and complementary approach is to reduce the amount of knowledge required to
interact with agents. This is especially true at the level of the cockpit considered as a global
work environment (or macro-interface with functions, functional patterns or agents provided as
resources to interact with the airplane, the airspace and the ATC). Introducing intra- and inter-
agent coherence into cockpits seriously contributes to limit the necessary knowledge to use
them: agents can be classed according to the kind of cooperative modes they entertain with the
crew and coherent communication protocols, feedback techniques and support to mental
modelling can be established. The current situation with cockpits might be similar to the
situation of interactive computers prior to the introduction of coherent GUIs, when every
application had its own way to interact with the user.
Another important issue already considered by designers as decreasing the amount of
knowledge that is not intuitive is familiarity. Thanks to the introduction into cockpits of more
"natural" cooperative and communication modes (e.g., multi-modal and multi-media), the
everyday life experience of interaction situations could be made more usable.
Conclusion
The influences of the introduction of new and sophisticated automation technologies in the last
generations of commercial aircraft regarding the pilots-systems interactions has been
extensively described by numerous experts in aeronautics and human factors engineering.
Technology ailows a proliferation of interaction possibilities with increasing level of
automation autonomy and poor feedback capabilities. These changes create new cognitive
demands for the pilots, demands that turn to be he highest precisely during the most critical
flight phases, where one would have expected the automation to be of the highest utility (Sarter
& Woods, 1993. See also Moll van Charente et al., 1992, for similar results in the medical
domain).
In summary, the complexity and lack of transparency of current automation challenge the
pilot's ability to cooperate with the sophisticated systems he is provided with. At least three sets
of measures can be explored to tackle the difficulties showed between current technologies and
designs. The fu'st set of measures would aim at improving the crew-automation interface as
suggested above. A second approach to improve the quality of the cooperation is to decrease the
cognitive demand on the pilot. More "natural" cooperative and communication modes are
considered by cognitive psychologists as rather "effortless" processes, thanks to the many
years spent to learning and automate them to interact with other humans. Improving mutual
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modelsofeachother(itreducestheneedtocommunicate),increasingreliabilityandthemeans
to assessit, givingagentsthepossibilityawarenessof theirownscopeorcompetence,or
providingdynamicfeedbackforimportantmodesorintentionalchanges(e.g.,Billings,1991;
Onken,1992;Sarter& Woods,1993)areamongtheseveralpathsdesignersfollow.Thethird
setofmeasuresis toconceiveoftheinteractionsbetweenthepilots,thevariousautomated
resources,andeventheATCandotherairplanesasadistributedcooperativemulti-agent
architectureinwhicheachpartnerisengaged,incollaborationwithallotheragents,in the
pursuitofacommonsystemgoal.
Tosketchthecurrentproblemsencounteredwiththe"technology-centeredautomation,"
Wiener(1989)reportsthathemostcommonquestionsa kedbypilotsinglasscockpitsare:
"whatisit doing?",whydidit dothat?"and"whatwill it donext?";towhichSarterand
Woods(1993)add:"howintheworlddidIevergetintothatmode?"
Webelievethatallthoseinterrogationscouldbereinterpretedinthefightoftheconceptsand
methodologydevelopedinthispaper.
Accordingtotheanalysismadeontheeffectsofcurrentautomationincockpits,wesuggest
toextendthatfistbyadding:"howcan l coax agents into performing what I want them to ?"
But as we have tried to highlight, this might not the right way to envisage operator-
automation interactions. We here suggest that a shift in view could be fruitful, which would
envisage both human and artificial agents as collaborative partners. And new technologies
should facilitate that shift.
The question to be asked should rather be: "how can we together perform the missions I am
in charge of ?"
Facing that new complexity, we suggest that the certification of future equipment and
designs could benefit from a systematic methodology aimed at identifying the most critical
problems in pilot-automation interactions. This paper constitutes one attempt to come up with
such a methodology.
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